NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 49 | Number 2

Article 16

2-1-1971

Torts -- Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance
Fred H. Moody Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Fred H. Moody Jr., Torts -- Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance, 49 N.C. L. Rev. 402 (1971).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol49/iss2/16

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

ancing, the courts have adopted rules which reflect the whole evolution
of industrial technological advances, business methods, social values, and
popluation. In Harwell, North Carolina took the path of least net injustice.
MICHAEL GUNTER

Torts-Comparative Injury Doctrine of Nuisance
Should a court of equity close a forty-five million dollar cement plant,
thereby destroying the jobs of over three hundred workers and depriving
the county of important tax revenue, in order to prevent comparatively
minor damages1 to nearby property? This was the question that confronted the New York Court of Appeals recently in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co.2 The cement plant emitted dirt, smoke, and vibrations which
neighboring property owners claimed injured their lands. The owners
filed -several suits asking the court to restrain the operation of the plant
as a nuisance and to award money damages for past injury. The trial
court found' that the operation of the plant did indeed constitute a
nuisance, even though the plant was equipped with the most effective
pollution control devices available, and that plaintiffs had been substantially
injtired. Damages for past injuries were awarded, but the court refused
to issue an injunction because of the great hardship it would bring upon
defendant and the comnunityY The appellate division affirmed.4
The court of appeals agreed with the lower courts that closing the plant
was too drastic a remedy but disagreed with the manner in which'the
lower courts had avoided such remedy. With one judge dissenting, the
court reversed the order of the trial court and instructed that an injunction*be issued unless defendant paid plaintiffs' permanent damages.
S-fch relief, "said-.the court, would do justice between the parties as it
would fully redress the economic loss to plaintiffs' properites without being
overly- oppressive to defendant. Citing United States v. Causby,5 the
' , Approximately 535 dollars per month.
"2- 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). This decision consolidated appeals handled separately by the appellate division.
' Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup, Ct.
f967).
o "-Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d' 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1968); Meliak v. -Atlantic Cement Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 578, 295 N.Y:S.2d 622
(1968) (mem.).
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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court said "[t] he theory of damage is the 'servitude on land' of plaintiffs
imposed by defendant's nuisance." 6 And, said the court, since plaintiffs'
acceptance of the permanent damages would be in compensation for a
servitude on the lands, plaintiffs would be barred from future recovery.'
Apparently the court's decision overrules previous New York cases6
and aligns the state with those jurisdictions which adhere to the comparative injury doctrine.9 That doctrine, stated simply, says that a court of
equity should deny injunctive relief, notwithstanding the fact that the
existence of a nuisance and substantial injury to plaintiff have been established, when issuance of the injunction would cause defendant much
greater hardship than continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff.Y
Such balancing of equities has been justified by courts which accept
the doctrine as a natural consequence of several fundamental principles of
equity. These courts insist that the granting or withholding of relief by
a court of equity always rests in the discretion of the chancellor. As one
court has put it, "To an injunction ... no one has an absolute and unqualified right. Such an application appeals to the conscience of the
chancellor, to the exercise of a wise and sound discretion .... 11
The extraordinary nature of injunctive relief is also stressed as supporting the comparative injury doctrine. Most likely a court about to
compare the hardships will make some comment reminiscent of Mr. Justice
Baldwin's statement that "[t]here is no power the exercise of which is
-26 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319.

judge Jasen in his dissent attacked the majority's apparent overthrow, of the
long-standing New York rule that a nuisance which results in substantial continuing damage to neighboring property should be enjoined. The judge also
referred to the grave dangers to health cause by particulate pollution and to the
unconstitutionality of allowing defendant to impose a servitude on plaintiffs' lands
by the payment of money damages. As an alternative to the majority's conditional
injunction, Judge Jasen proposed issuance of an absolute injunction to take effect
in eighteen months if the nuisance was not abated by then. 26 N.Y.2d at -, 257
N.E.2d at 875-77, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319-22.
8
E.g., Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913);
McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907) ; Strobel v.
Kerr Salt Co., 164 N.Y. 303, 58 N.E. 142 (1900).
'For a thorough discussion of this doctrine see McClintock, Discretionto Deny
Injunwtion Against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REv. 565 (1928);
Mechem, The Peasant in His Cottage: Sonze Comments on the Relative Hardship Doctrine in Equity, 28 S. CAL. L. REv. 139 (1955); Annot., 61 A.L.R. 924
(1929); Annot., 31 L.R.A. (n.s.) 881 (1911).
" E.g., Pritchett v. Wade, 261 Ala. 156, 73 So. 2d 533 (1954) ; Storey v. Centtal
Hide & Rendering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (1950) ; Beard v. Coal River

Collieries, 103 W. Va. 240, 137 S.E. 7 (1927).
" McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927,
940 (9th Cir. 1908), cert. denied, 212 U.S. 583 (1909).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound
discretion, or is more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuing of an
injunction... ."" Likewise the comparative injury jurisdictions point out
that a court of equity should never grant relief which would be inequitable
or "operate contrary to the real justice of the case."'1 3 From such principles of equity these courts conclude that an injunction is not the proper
remedy when it would cause defendant disproportionately greater hardship than continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff.
Not all courts agree, however. Previous New York cases 1 4 and a substantial number of other jurisdictions 5 reject the notion of balancing the
equities. These courts argue that whenever a clear case of nuisance is
established and the wrong causes plaintiff substantial injury which cannot be adequately remedied at law, plaintiff has an absolute right to injunctive relief even though there is a large disparity in the economic consequences of the nuisance and of the injunction.1"
Courts which refuse to balance the equities generally disagree with
12 Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821, 827 (No. 1617) (C.C.D.N.J.
1830). For an example of a nuisance case employing such a statement see Bartman
v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1962).
" McCarthy v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 164 F. 927,
940 (9th Cir. 1908).
" See cases cited note 8 supra.
SE.g., Meriwether Sand & Gravel Co. v. State, 181 Ark. 216, 26 S.W.2d 57
(1930); Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928
(1911); Wente v. Commonwealth Fuel Co., 232 Ill. 526, 83 N.E. 1049 (1908);
Brede v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919);
Hennessey v. Carmony, 50 N.J. Eq. 616, 25 A. 374 (1892).
North Carolina apparently rejects the comparative injury doctrine also.
"[W]here a nuisance is established.., no private enterprise for the mere purpose
of bringing gain to its owner can be allowed to destroy one's home or to impair
his health. Both are irreparable injuries, and no damage can compensate a man
for destruction of his home or for the undermining of his health." Redd v. Edna
Cotton Mills, 136 N.C. 342, 344, 48 S.E. 761, 762 (1904). However, the state's
courts will balance the equities when an injunction would cause "public inconvenience" and that term is given a very broad meaning. See Attorney General ex
rel. Bradsher v. Lea, 38 N.C. 301 (1844); Barnes v. Calhoun, 37 N.C. 199 (1842).
" Phrased more eloquently:
The law, in cases of this kind, will not undertake to balance the conveniences,
or estimate the difference between the injury sustained by the plaintiff and
the loss that may result to the defendant from having its trade and business,
as now carried on, found to be a nuisance. No one has a right to erect
works which are a nuisance to a neighboring owner, and then say he has
expended large sums of money in the erection of his works, while the
neighboring property is comparatively of little value. The neighboring owner
is entitled to the reasonable and comfortable enjoyment of his property,
and, if his rights in this respect are invaded, he is entitled to the protection
of the law, let the consequences be what they may.
Susquehana Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 73 Md. 268, 282-83, 20 A. 900, 902 (1890).

19711

COMPARATIVE INJURY DOCTRINE

the comparative injury jurisdictions as to the nature of equitable relief,
contending that such relief is not "of grace" but is a matter of right
whenever plaintiff is able to make out his case.
The phrase "of grace" predicated of a decree in equity . ..has no

rightful place in the jurisprudence of a free commonwealth, and ought
to be relegated to the age in which it was appropriate. It has been
somewhere said that equity has its laws as law has its equity. This
is but another form of saying that equitable remedies are administered
in accordance with rules as certain as human wisdom can devise,
leaving their application only in doubtful cases to the discretion,
not the unmerited favor or grace of the chancellor. Certainly no chancellor ...will at this day admit that he dispenses favors or refuses

rightful demands, or deny that, when a suitor has brought his cause
clearly within the rules of equity jurisprudence, the relief he asks is
demandable ex debito justitiae, and needs not be implored ex gratia.17
Courts which hold this view of the nature of equitable relief argue that
the comparative injury doctrine takes the property of the poor and gives
it to the rich,18 and "puts the hardship on the party in whose favor the
legal right exists instead of on the wrong-doer." 9 Furthermore, these
courts contend that the injunction cannot result in injury to defendant
because defendant is not injured by being restrained from doing that
which he had no right to do.2"
The dichotomy between those courts which reject the comparative
injury doctrine and those which accept it, however, is not as distinct
as the foregoing discussion might suggest. The dividing line is blurred,
sometimes beyond recognition, by the exceptions that many of the courts
which purport to reject the doctrine make to their no-balancing rule.
For example, most jurisdictions balance the equities on applications for
injunctions pendente lite and refuse such applications where the injunction
would injure defendant much more than continuance of the nuisance
would damage plaintiff.2 Likewise, the equities may be balanced whenever: (1) plaintiff's injury is trivial per se even though occasioned by an
Pa. 549,
25 A. 1,125,
127N.E.
(1892).
McElroy,
" Walters
Whalen v.v. Union
Bag 151
& Paper
Co., 557,
208 N.Y.
5, 101
805, 806 (1913).
1 3. PomERoy, EQUITABLE REmEDIES § 530 (1905).
" Walters v. McElroy, 151 Pa. 549, 558, 25 A. 125, 127 (1892).

'

1

" E.g., United States v. Luce, 141 F. 385 (C.C.D. Del. 1905) ; Sexton v. Public

Serv. Co-Ordinated Transp., 5 N.J. Super. 555, 68 A.2d 648 (1949); Huskin v.
Yancey Hosp., Inc., 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
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admitted nuisance ;22 (2) plaintiff is guilty of laches or there is an element
of estoppel present ;2 (3) plaintiff comes to the court in bad faith, as
when he seeks the court's aid only to force defendant to pay an exorbitant
price for his property;24 or (4) the public has an interest in the continuation of the nuisance.25 These exceptions, combined with the agility with
which some jurisdictions are able to alter their viewpoints,2 0 make simple
categorizations of a court's position extremely perilous and render predictions of whether a given court will or will not balance the equities in
a particular case most unreliable.
But if a court does balance the equities and the balancing results in
the denial of the injunction, one question is invariably raised: Does the
denial of the injunction amount to an improper taking of plaintiff's
property? Boomer vividly demonstrates the problem. Defendant's activities invaded plaintiffs' property rights. The court, however, instead of
ordering the cessation of the wrongful acts, allowed defendant to purchase
those rights which were being invaded and placed plaintiffs in such a
position that they had no choice but to sell the rights.27 Such action would
appear to amount to a kind of private, and therefore unconstitutional, inverse condemnation. s
Most courts which deny injunctive relief after balancing the conveniences, however, are not impressed by the private condemnation argu22 E.g., MacDonald v. Perry, 32 Ariz. 39, 255 P. 494 (1927); Gray v. Man499, 28 N.E. 498 (1891).
hattan Ry., 128 N.Y.
'8See Grey ex rel. Simmons v. Mayor of City of Patterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385,
45 A. 995 (1900); Knoth v. Manhattan Ry., 187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E. 1015 (1907);
Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 P. 418 (1918).
' See Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co., 38 Mich. 46 (1878).
"E.g., Daughtry v. Warren, 85 N.C. 136 (1881); Booth-Kelly Lumber Co.
v. City of Eugene, 67 Ore. 381, 136 P. 29 (1913).
" Compare Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065
(1904), with Elliott Nursery Co. v. Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345
(1924).
2 Of course plaintiffs could have refused to accept the permanent damages and
maintained successive actions at law for damages as further injury was incurred.
Such a course, however, is so onerous as to eliminate it as a realistic alternative.
"Boomer is strikingly similar to inverse condemnation cases such as Ferguson
v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, 5 NE.2d 801 (1936), and Papphenheim v.
Metropolitan Elevated Ry., 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518 (1891). In cases of this
type, defendant's activities substantially impair some property right of plaintiff and
suit is brought to enjoin the acts causing the injury. Since the defendant possesses
the power to condemn the invaded property the court usually grants an injunction
conditioned on defendant's payment of plaintiff's permanent damages and thereby
avoids forcing defendant to institute a separate condemnation proceeding. The
critical difference between these cases and the principal case is that the Atlantic
Cement Co. had no power to condemn the property rights which the operations of
its plant invaded.

1971]

COMPARATIVE INJURY DOCTRINE

ment. Many, 9 including the United States Supreme Court,"° follow the
practice of the court of appeals in Boomer and make little or no reply to the
contention. Others hint that the emphasis on the constitutional impropriety of the court's action is misplaced and that the only question
involved concerns the abiltiy of a court of equity to mold its judgment
to fit the circumstances of the case. And this ability, it is said, is not
affected by defendant's lack of the power of condemnation.3 1 One court,
replying directly to the condemnation contention, noted that similar arguments could be advanced in cases in which injunctions are denied because
of the adequacy of the remedy at law.3 2 "The answer to the 'condemnation'
argument," said the same court, "is that one who comes to equity does so
by choice. Equity forces nothing from him, and he may stand on his legal
remedies if he wishes. But if he wants equity he must do equity."3
Neither the courts' silence, nor their emphasis on the powers of equity
courts, nor their instructions on what one must do to merit equitable relief,
however, resolves the issue. The fact remains that defendant has, in
effect, been allowed to condemn plaintiff's property rights for private purposes by creating a nuisance which invades those rights. If such action
is not unconstitutional, it would seem that the courts should be able to
state why it is not.
Another problem raised by Boomer and neglected by the opinion
concerns the terms of the conditional injunction. Should provision be made
to allow defendant to recover part of the damages paid if the nuisance
is abated in the future? Or, conversely, should the decree allow plaintiffs
to return to the court if the nuisance becomes more intense in the future?
Probably the court need concern itself with neither of these contingencies when drafting the decree. As for the possiblity of future
abatement, it is generally said that where a nuisance is not legally abatable
the defendant cannot object to the assessment of permanent damages
because the court will presume that the nuisance will continue to operate
" See cases cited note 10 supra.
01 See Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933); New
York City v. Pine, 185 U.S. 93 (1902).
" Knoth v. Manhattan Ry., 109 App. Div. 802, 96 N.Y.S. 844 (1905), aff'd,
187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E..1015 (1907).
"Bartman v. Shobe, 353 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1962).
Id. at 555. Interestingly enough one court has suggested that the issuance of
an injunction that would cause defendant comparatively greater hardship than continuance of the nuisance would cause plaintiff would constitute an improper appropriation of defendant's property. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron
Co., 113 Tenn. 331,83 S.W. 658 (1904).
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under the same conditions for an indefiinte period.34 Since defendant's
ability to in fact abate the nuisance will not prevent the recovery of
permanent damages, it may be assumed that he should not be allowed to
recover any money paid to plaintiffs if the nuisance is actually abated.
On plaintiffs' side, so long as the nature and extent of the servitude conveyed to defendant by acceptance of the permanent damages is clearly
defined, plaintiffs should have no trouble obtaining relief from increased
injury by an action to enjoin the overburdening of the servient estate.
Defining the nature and extent of the servitude conveyed, however, may
itself present serious difficulties since it is an open question how an easement to pollute is to be measured.
Notwithstanding the questions left unanswered by the decision in
Boomer, it is difficult to quarrel with the majority's resolution of the
conflict between the parties. The facts of the case placed the court in the
unenviable position of being forced to choose between following its former
decisions and closing the cement plant or overruling itself and awarding
plaintiffs what seems less than adequate remedy. No other alternative presented itself. The cement company could not be forced to experiment with
pollution control devices because its plant already had the best available.
Retention of the case to allow the court to keep the situation under its
supervision would have been possible but would not have satisfied the needs
of plaintiffs. And a delayed injunction, such as that proposed by the
dissent,3 5 would have amounted to nothing more, under the circumstances,
than a delayed closing of defendant's plant. Thus it appears that the
course followed by the majority was the only practical solution to the
problem.
This is not to say that the decision is to be applauded. On the contrary, it is most unsatisfactory. Pollution continues to emanate from
defendant's plant-pollution which not only injures plaintiffs' properties
but also damages the health of the general public. And the fact remains
that plaintiffs have been afforded inadequate relief. All that can be said
about the decision is that it is an example of a case which, because of the
limited powers and resources of the courts, is incapable of satisfactory
judicial resolution.
It must be remembered, however, that all pollution cases are not as
extreme as Boomer. Seldom do the facts of a case force a court to elect
"Northern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co. v. W.J. & M.S. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 351, 200
N.E. 620, 626 (1936).
526 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 877, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
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between closing a multi-million dollar operation, thereby devastating a
large business and destroying the economy of an entire community, and
awarding the plaintiff inadequate relief. In the majority of pollution
cases other alternatives are present. For example, it may be possible to
reduce or eliminate the injurious pollution by obligating the defendant
to install effective pollution control devices. Or, where the defendant
is an extremely wealthy concern, it may be possible to stimulate the
development of new and more efficient pollution control devices by forcing
investment in research. At the very least, a court should explore all
plausible courses of action before resorting to the comparative injury
doctrine as a means of resolving the dispute. Such resolution is so unsatisfactory, especially in the pollution area where the public interest is
great, that it should be limited to cases in which the facts allow no other
solution. Above all the courts must not evade the problems raised by the
pollution crisis by indiscriminately employing the doctrine of comparative
injury.
FRED H. MooDY, JR.

